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Introduction
Until relatively recently, like other Southern European countries, Portugal was a 
country of emigration. Political and economic hardship and lack of opportunities 
acted as motivating factors compelling people to search for prospects in more 
advanced European economies or across the Atlantic. However, at the end of the 
1980s following the entry of Portugal into the eeC, the economic tide began to 
turn, leading to the civil construction boom in the 1990s. As a result, from that 
point through the turn of the century, Portugal became a destination for interna-
tional labor migrants. Labor migrants arriving through both formal and informal 
networks from Eastern Europe and Asia and a new wave from Brazil added to the 
migrants that had arrived earlier from the former colonies, namely Portuguese-
speaking African countries.
The sudden change in Portugal’s migration balance meant the country was ill-
prepared in policy and legislative terms for the incorporation of the new and 
diverse migrant groups. As such, immigration policy developed retrospectively. 
Despite this, the subsequent development in immigration and integration policy 
as well as nationality law has attracted attention as a frequently cited example of 
best-practice across Europe. At present, however, Portugal finds itself in a severe 
financial crisis. As a consequence, a growing body of evidence suggests not only that 
the inflow of migrants into Portugal has slowed, but that return migration is occur-
ring to some countries, particularly Brazil and Eastern Europe. 
The current economic climate poses major questions about how immigrants 
will react and be impacted by the economic downturn. This article explores these 
processes, illustrating the link between national economic growth and the rise in 
immigration in the 1990s through the turn of the century. It considers the same 
relationship, albeit with the inverse direction, in the post-crisis period in Portugal. 
In addition to changes in flows, stock, and policy, attitudes toward immigrants and 
  *  Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning (igot), University of 
Lisbon, lucinda.fonseca@netcabo.pt.
** Centro de Estudos Geográficos, igot, University of Lisbon, jmcgarrigle@ceg.ul.pt.
52 MARIA LUCINDA FONSECA AND JENNIFER McGARRIGLE
inter-group trust in Portugal compared with Greece and Spain are examined using 
recent survey data from the geitonies project.1 
The Dynamics of International Migration and Economic 
Growth in Portugal over the Last Two Decades
In the 1990s, Portugal underwent a migratory transition process that transformed 
a traditional country of emigration into one of immigration.2 In the time between the 
1981 and 1991 population censuses, net migration reached 404 747, becoming 
the main factor in demographic growth.
This is mainly due to the significant increase in the number of foreigners set-
tling in Portugal after 1998 and especially after 2000 (see Figure 1). This phenom-
enon, which cannot be dissociated from the favorable economic conditions in 
Portugal during this period, has also been linked to other more structural causes, 
namely the Portuguese population’s increasing skill levels, which contributed to ris-
ing labor market expectations, the maintenance of low-cost and labor-intensive sec-
tors, the relevance of highly seasonal economic sectors (e.g., tourism-related activi-
ties, construction, etc.), the consolidation of the heavily segmented labor market, 
the size of the informal economy, and also the perception of Portugal as an “easy 
country of entry and stay” in the EU context (Fonseca 2008; Baganha, Marques, and 
Góis 2004). This process started somewhat earlier in other Southern European 
countries like Spain and Greece and has been explained by various factors such as 
joining the eeC in the 1980s and the demographic and economic transition, namely 
the coexistence of labor- and capital-intensive activity sectors in the context of a 
modernizing service economy (King, Fielding, and Black 1997). 
The increase in foreigners registered in 2001 (Figure 1) is the statistical con-
sequence of the implementation of the stay permits scheme under the changes 
that were introduced in the 1998 Foreigners Law by Decree Law No. 4/2001. This 
enabled the regularization of the status of more than 180 000 foreigners between 
2001 and 2004, the majority from Eastern European countries (in particular, the 
Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and Romania) and Brazil. From 2004 onward, at the end 
of an extended period of public works, in the context of economic recession and 
more efficient mechanisms for controlling irregular migration and the employment 
of undocumented workers, the trend observed in previous years reversed, with a 
1  The authors gathered data in the  framework of the geitonies project  (Generating Interethnic Toler-
ance and Neighbourhood Integration in European Urban Spaces), which lasted from May 1, 2008 to 
April 30, 2011, and was funded by the European Union’s Seventh framework Programme.
2  More than 3.5 million Portuguese nationals are currently living abroad (Observatório da Emigração 
2008).
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reduction in the number of legally documented foreign citizens. The decline mainly 
affected the Ukrainian community. However, between 2005 and 2009, the num-
ber of foreign citizens still grew due mostly to the inflows of Chinese, Brazilian, 
Moldovan, and Romanian immigrants and the regularization of the status of some 
undocumented immigrants (Malheiros and Fonseca 2011).
The worsening of the country’s economic and financial situation is reflected in 
decreased immigration to Portugal, the increased emigration of Portuguese citi-
zens, as well as in return flows to sending countries or re-emigration to other desti-
nations of a growing number of foreigners (Pires, Machado, Peixoto, and Vaz 
2010). Thus, in 2010, the number of immigrants decreased by 1.97 percent, going 
against the growth trend observed over the previous two decades. However, it is 
important to stress that part of this decline can also be explained by the acquisi-
tion of Portuguese nationality by a considerable number of foreigners residing in 
the country (sef 2011).
As far as emigration is concerned, Malheiros (2011, 135) contends that some 
migratory flows to traditional destinations such as Switzerland, Germany, and 
Luxemburg were reactivated and new destinations such as the UK, Spain, and Angola 
figure 1
evolution of tHe number of legal foreigners 
(all Categories) settled in portugal (1990-2010)*
*  Until 2000, only foreigners with residence permits. From 2001 to 2004, foreigners with residence 
permits and stay permits (title introduced in 2001). In 2005, 2006, and 2007, foreigners with resi-
dence permits, renewed stay permits, and long-term visas. In 2008, 2009, and 2010, foreigners with 
residence permits and long-term visas. 
sourCe: sef (n.d.a).
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have emerged. It is estimated that in the second half of the last decade, there were 
approximately 70 000 annual departures.
The growth of immigration to Portugal during the last two decades was 
accompanied by the diversification of sending areas. As is the case in other 
Southern European countries, like Spain and Italy, the dynamics of immigration to 
Portugal are characterized by a growing diversity in migrants’ countries of origin, 
including migratory flows of workers and family members from Brazil, Portuguese-
speaking African countries (palop), Eastern and Central Europe, and Romania, as 
well as highly skilled migrants, retirees, and lifestyle migrants from other European 
Union member states.
At the end of 2010, the largest groups of foreigners in Portugal were Brazilians 
(119 363), Ukrainians (49 505), and Cape Verdeans (43 979). Among the EU 
member states, the Romanians and the British were the largest groups (36 830 
and 17 196, respectively). In addition, as Figure 2 shows, Guinea-Bissau, China, 
Moldova, and Saint Tome and Prince are also included in the top 10 nationalities 
of documented foreign citizens settled in Portugal.
figure 2
doCumented foreign Citizens residing in portugal 
(main nationalities) (2010)
sourCe: Developed by the authors with information from sef (n.d.b).
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Concomitant to the growing diversity of sending countries, changes also 
occurred in the migratory processes and in migrants’ social and professional pro-
files. The development of the migratory chain from Eastern Europe represents a 
turning point in the traditional processes of immigration to Portugal. The organiza-
tional strategies based on social networks that characterized immigration from 
palop have been replaced by a system organized by international labor recruiting 
networks. Another new element brought about by the rising flow of immigrants 
from Eastern Europe is related to their relatively high educational and professional 
skill levels. A large proportion has intermediate-level technical training or higher 
education. Despite this, like immigrants of African origin, they work predominant-
ly in socially devalued and low-paid activities such as civil construction (men) and 
cleaning and domestic services (women). However, a considerable proportion of 
immigrants work in agriculture, specifically in the regions of Alentejo, Ribatejo, 
and Oeste, and in some industrial activities, particularly labor-intensive ones in 
the Littoral North and Center (Fonseca, Ormond et al. 2005; Fonseca 2008).
A recent study by Reis, Serra, Tolda, and Pereira (2010) clearly demonstrates 
the relationship between economic growth and the expansion of the labor force 
(extensive growth model), where in a context of a specific economic growth cycle 
(1996-2002), Portugal became a country of immigration (Figure 3). This labor-
intensive model results in low levels of innovation and a lack of articulation with the 
European economic context. As a consequence, there was a divergence in compari-
son with the EU average and stagnant economic growth, aggravated by the effects 
of the international economic and financial crisis. 
The Spanish and Greek economies have also profoundly contracted since 
2008. In the case of Greece, due to the external debt crisis, the recession has become 
more serious and gdp decreased by 2 percent in 2009, 4.5 percent in 2010, and, 
according to Eurostat estimates, the decline will reach 5.5 percent in 2011. Spain, 
contrary to Greece and Portugal, began to show signs of recovery in 2011, although the 
most recent Eurostat estimates (0.7 percent) point toward a much lower figure 
than that defined by the government at the beginning of the year. Moreover, Spain 
has one of the highest unemployment rates in the EU: 22.8 percent in October 2011.
The economic benefits of immigration to Portugal have been identified by sever-
al research studies (Ferreira, Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Corrêa d’Almeida 2003, 
Corrêa d’Almeida and Duarte Silva 2007; Reis, Serra, Tolda, and Pereira 2010; 
Carvalho 2004; Faustino, Peixoto, and Baptista 2009), in particular its positive 
impact on gdp and public finance. The Portuguese labor market has also benefited 
from immigration. Migrants have occupied low-paying jobs that were difficult to 
fill, thus avoiding any negative impact on the employment of Portuguese citizens 
(Ferreira, Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Peixoto 2007). So, the negative impacts of 
immigration on the labor market are mainly felt by immigrants themselves through 
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continued low wages and high precariousness. Therefore, there is little competi-
tion between immigrant and native workers or between immigrants from the more 
recent migratory waves and those from previous flows (Pereira 2010).
Over the last two decades, the activity/employment rates of both foreign-born 
men and women are above those of the native-born. According to data from the 
Employment Survey conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (ine, or 
Statistics Portugal) in 2009, the foreign population residing in Portugal accounted 
for 4.5 percent of the total active population, whereas their global activity rate was 
77.1 percent, 15 points higher than that of the Portuguese (61.9 percent). In an 
analysis by gender, one can observe higher differences among men with an activity 
rate of 84.4 percent among immigrants and 68.2 percent among Portuguese 
nationals. The equivalent proportions for women are lower than those for men, 
but foreign female workers also have a higher activity rate than their Portuguese 
counterparts: 70.5 percent and 56 percent, respectively. Despite the fact that this is 
partly explained by the younger age structure of foreigners, it is worth mentioning 
that the difference still persists when the activity rate is controlled for age (oeCd 
2008). In addition, it should be noted that the number of immigrant workers is 
most likely underestimated, due to the fact that a considerable number labor in the 
informal sector, namely in construction and domestic work.3 Therefore, according 
3  Several authors estimate that Portugal’s informal economy may contribute more than 20 percent to 
gnp (Schneider and Klinglmair 2004; mtss/dgeep 2006; Abreu and Peixoto 2008).
figure 3
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to some estimates, the proportion of immigrants in the total active population may 
reach 6 percent (Ferreira, Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Peixoto 2008).
The Evolution of Policy and Legislation 
In Response to Immigration
Until the mid-1990s, immigration policy in Portugal was rudimentary, focusing to 
a large extent on the regulation of flows and responding primarily to the process of 
post-colonial transition. While it has been retrospectively and gradually integrated 
into the legislative framework, it can be said to have developed rapidly and quite 
uniformly. This is due to an assortment of factors including the very fast growth in 
the number of foreigners in the country, their relative and visible disadvantage, 
and the expansion of lobbies and the influence of the European Union. In addition, 
the lack of a strong extreme-right party has meant that immigration has not been 
politicized to the extent that it has in other EU states. 
Regardless of political awareness of the illegal character of migration to Portugal 
from Portuguese-speaking Africa after decolonization and entry into the EU, little was 
done to regulate this flow (Baganha 2005; Peixoto and Sabino 2009) until the two 
processes of extraordinary regularization in the 1990s. In 1992/1993, the papers of 
around 40 000 undocumented migrants were regularized and of approximately 
35 000 more in 1996.
The policy focus broadened in scope under the Socialists (1995-2002) to tackle 
issues of integration (Peixoto and Sabino 2009, 36). To this end, a less restrictive 
immigration law (244/98) was enforced in 1998, which strengthened the principle 
of equality of rights and made provision for family reunion and regularization 
(Fonseca, Caldeira, and Esteves 2002; Baganha and Malheiros 2000; Pires 2003). 
Despite these advances, some authors argue that immigration policy only really 
developed after the turn of the century in response to the increasing visibility of 
illegal migrants and claims of labor shortages (Fonseca, Malheiros et al. 2002; 
Peixoto and Sabino 2009). For the first time, economic issues became central in the 
immigration debate (Fonseca, Malheiros, and Silva 2005). Decree Law no. 4 was 
enforced in 2001, under which the circumstances of 185 000 migrant workers were 
regularized (Fonseca and Goracci 2007). “Stay permits” allowed legal residence 
for one year, renewable for up to five years (Fonseca, Malheiros, and Silva 2005), 
after which immigrants could apply for a residence permit (Peixoto and Sabino 2009) 
and provisions for family members were made. A quasi-quota system was also 
implemented to respond to the demand for labor. Fonseca, Caldeira, and Esteves 
(2002) assert that this was the first step toward bringing immigration policy in line 
with eC regulations. In practice, however, this system served to regularize the circum-
stances of existing migrants as opposed to recruiting new ones (Fonseca, Malheiros, 
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and Silva 2005). The Social Democrats passed the more restrictive Decree Law 
no. 34 in February 2003, restricting entries and family reunion, strengthening the 
mechanisms to control irregular migration, and reinforcing the quota system as 
the principal mechanism of control (Peixoto and Sabino 2009). This law has been 
criticized as having overlooked human rights in favor of the labor market, though it 
proved largely unsuccessful in curbing illegal migration and in meeting short-term 
labor demands. Following this, two consecutive regularization processes took place.
In 2007, a new immigration law (no. 23/2007, July 4), still in effect today, was 
approved under the Socialist government. In short, previous legal admission titles 
were simplified and reduced in number and include the short-term, transit, and 
stopover visas and the two main visas, the temporary permit and the residence per-
mit. Preconditions for acquiring the latter include residence for five years, means 
of subsistence, no criminal record, and Portuguese language skills. Family reunifi-
cation provisions were widened and a less cumbersome quota system implement-
ed (Peixoto and Sabino 2009). Harsher disincentives were introduced to counter 
illegal immigration and combat trafficking, while treatment of illegal migrants was 
made more favorable. The law also enables minors born in Portugal (and their par-
ents) who attend school to obtain residence permits without a prior visa. Recently, 
in response to the current economic crisis, a joint decree of the Ministries of 
Interior and Labor and Social Solidarity (Decree no. 760/2009, July 16) relaxed 
means of subsistence as a precondition to remain in the country for involuntarily 
unemployed immigrants.
Citizenship, like immigration policy, was given little political consideration until 
after decolonization. Fears of mass migration culminated in the 1975 Nationality 
Law (Decree-Law no. 308-A/75, June 24), which to a large extent restricted na -
tionality to those born in European Portugal or the descendants of emigrants. By de f-
inition, many African immigrants residing in Portugal became foreigners. Upheld 
by similar principles, the 1981 Nationality Law (Law no. 37/81, October 3) transferred 
the criteria of ius soli (right of territory/soil) to ius sanguinis (Fonseca, Malheiros et al. 
2002). The law became even more restrictive with its 1994 amendment (Law 
no. 25/94, August 19). 
With the increase in the immigrant population, it became clear over time that 
the legislative framework needed to adapt to the new reality. Yet, the legislature 
only embraced the question of citizenship in 2005. Finally, in 2006, a new national-
ity law was approved (Law no. 2/2006, April 17, regulated by Decree Law no. 237-
A/2006, December 14). The new law updated the legislative framework in line 
with the European Convention on Nationality (Healy 2011a). It strengthened 
once again the principle of ius soli (right of territory). The Portuguese-born descen-
dants of immigrants who had either been stateless or inherited their parent’s 
nationality now had a subjective right to Portuguese nationality, the right to apply 
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for it. The new law also extended the right of nationality to a much wider group of 
immigrants and their descendants (Healy 2011b). 
Thus presently, Portuguese nationality may be obtained by way of attribution 
(nationality of origin), by effect of law or will, which corresponds to cases of citi-
zens who are Portuguese by origin, or by the acquisition of nationality (derived 
nationality). This last case can result from three situations: by the effect of will, by 
adoption, or by naturalization.
The new law reduced the requirements and residence can now be proved by 
any type of valid residence title. Language proficiency remains a requirement and 
individuals cannot have been sentenced to three years or more in prison under Por-
tuguese law. However, moral and civil rectitude and means of subsistence have been 
eliminated, eradicating socio-economic discrimination from the procedure (Healy 
2011a, 20).
A six-year legal residence requirement is applicable to first-generation immi-
grants. For Portuguese-born children or grandchildren of immigrants the principle 
of ius soli was reinstated in specific cases. The new law also recognizes de facto unions 
between heterosexual or homosexual couples. The acquisition of Portuguese nation-
ality only implies the loss of nationality of origin if the law of the country of origin 
determines it (for example in Ukrainian law).
While the policy and legislative measures outlined above have had undeniable 
impacts on integrating immigrants, integration grew into a policy goal in its own 
right. The main institutional body currently responsible for implementing integra-
tion policy and coordinating intercultural dialogue is the High Commission for 
Integration and Intercultural Dialogue (aCidi). The aCidi has been instrumental in 
developing the currently existing infrastructure to promote immigrant integration 
including the National Information Network for Immigrants; the National Immigrant 
Support Centers (Cnia); a national network of local centers (Clai), which are “one-
stop shops” for relevant state departments and services; and the Immigration 
Observatory to promote research. aCidi has been responsible for the implementation 
of the Plans for the Integration of Immigrants (2007-2009; 2010-2012) (Fonseca and 
Goracci 2007) and an array of other initiatives such as the Promotion of Immigrant 
Entrepreneurship, now in its third term (2011-2012). 
Other initiatives responding to particular needs have been implemented over 
the course of the last decade or so, such as the Schools Program targeting social 
exclusion among descendants of immigrants and minority ethnic groups living in 
problematic neighborhoods. 
Access to social services is granted in legislation, albeit problems are sometimes 
encountered in practice. All legal immigrants have access to the Social Insertion 
Income, a minimum income guarantee, though take-up rates are very low (oeCd 
2007, in Peixoto and Sabino 2009). The children of immigrants have access to the 
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educational system and all immigrants, regardless of legal status, have access to 
the Portuguese National Health Service. 
It is difficult to measure the degree to which government funding will be 
restricted in the domain of immigrant integration in the context of the current eco-
nomic crisis. However, a critical reading of the budget justifications for 2012 pro-
vides some insight into the changing reality:
“Despite the cuts presented, the government wants to ensure the overall mea-
sures of the II Plan for the Integration of Immigrants (2010-2012). . . . In a context of 
fiscal restraint, we intend to continue the work so far…with the support of Com-
munity funding (Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública 2011, 155). 
The Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis 
On Immigrants Living in Portugal
labor market
The economic and financial crisis has been very hard on the Portuguese economy. 
In 2009, gdp decreased by 2.5 percent compared to 2008. In 2010, a slight recovery 
produced 1.4-percent growth, but the Eurostat projections for 2011 point toward 
a contraction of 1.9 percent, whereas for EU27, it is estimated that gdp will grow by 
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1.6 percent. In addition, both Eurostat and the Bank of Portugal indicate a greater 
contraction in economic activity in 2012 than that anticipated for 2011 (Banco de 
Portugal 2011). 
The unfavorable evolution of the economy is clearly visible in the fast growth 
of unemployment. According to the Labor Force Survey (ine 2009), the unemploy-
ment rate grew from 7.6 percent in 2008 to 9.5 percent in 2009, 10.8 percent in 
2010, and 12.4 percent in the third quarter of 2011. The severe job losses over this 
period affected the immigrant population more seriously than non-immigrant workers, 
increasing the gap between the percentage of the two groups that is unemployed 
(Figure 4). In 2009, the unemployment rate among Portuguese citizens was 9.1 per-
cent, while for foreigners it was 7.3 points higher, reaching 16.4 percent and 17.3 
percent in the case of non-EU27 nationals (Peixoto and Iorio 2011). In 2010, the 
difference between both groups was more or less the same.
Unemployment affects women more than men, both for nationals and immi-
grants (Figure 5). However, it must be stressed that for the foreign population, the 
differences between male and female unemployment tend to be smaller in the two 
periods of greater economic slowdown, 2003-2004 and 2008-2009. This is primarily 
due to the fact that the sector most seriously harmed by the recession, namely civil 
construction, employs mostly males.
Portuguese law guarantees equal conditions of access to unemployment ben-
efits and to other social support schemes for documented foreign workers. After 
2007, the number of foreign workers registered in Ministry of Labor Employment 
figure 5
unemployment rate by gender and nationality (2003-2009) 
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Centers increased at a much faster rate than that of the Portuguese (Figure 6). 
Peixoto and Iorio (2011) argue that while this increase is in part a result of the 
higher number of regularized immigrants, who are thus protected by social securi-
ty, this explanation alone cannot account for the evolution observed. Therefore, it 
is legitimate to infer that the likelihood that foreign workers will become unem-
ployed has increased, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis.
figure 6
unemployment registered in employment Centers: portuguese 
and foreign Citizens (2003-2010) (2003=100)
sourCe:  Authors’ research at the Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social, Instituto de Emprego 
e Formação Profissional.
By using a geographically disaggregated analysis by nationality, increasing 
unemployment can be observed across groups. However, it is more intense among 
those who arrived in the more recent migratory waves, namely Romanians, fol-
lowed by Brazilians, Moldovans, and Ukrainians. Migrants from Cape Verde, 
Angola, and Guinea Bissau present lower growth rates, with the first two national-
ities showing almost identical trajectories (see Figure 7).
The number of foreigners receiving unemployment benefits reached 16 592 
in October 2011. Paradoxically, it is important to stress, however, that compared to 
the same period in the previous year, this was a 13.5 percent decline, even though the 
number of unemployed foreign workers registered in the Unemployment Centers 
continued to increase.
The economic crisis and the subsequent growth in unemployment have, in 
general, significantly worsened the living conditions of many foreign residents. This 
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is exacerbated by the fact that many immigrants have surpassed the maximum 
period for receiving unemployment benefits. Consequently, besides reduced immi-
gration to Portugal, in the last three years the flow of return to countries of origin 
or re-emigration to other destinations has been growing. Moreover, the number of 
people asking for financial help through the Assisted Volunteer Return Program 
sponsored by the International Organization for Migration has increased. Between 
January and October 2011, 1 790 people applied, a monthly average of 179, compared 
to 149 in 2010, 84 in 2009, 53 in 2008 and 27 in 2007. This represents a six-fold 
increase in the average monthly number of candidates between 2007 and 2011.
remittanCes
The effects of the economic and financial crisis are also visible in the levels of for-
eign workers’ savings. According to Central Bank of Portugal data, in the last three 
years, remittances sent to countries of origin decreased. Between 2003 and 2006, 
a remarkable increase in the remittances sent by immigrants, mostly to Brazil, was 
figure 7
unemployment of foreign Citizens registered in tHe employment Centers 
by main nationalities (2003-2010) (2003=100)
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observed. Since then, the figures have contracted, falling from €609 771 in 2006 
to €567 340 in 2010 (Figure 8).
Figure 8 also shows that despite the overall reduction over the past two years, 
in 2010 more than half of the remittances (54 percent) were sent to Brazil, 8.8 
percent to the Ukraine, 6.5 percent to the palop, 3.6 percent to Romania, and 27 
percent to other countries (of which 6.4 percent went to Asia).
In addition to the economic crisis, this drop in remittances may also be the 
result of the reduction in migratory flows to Portugal, given that more recently 
arrived migrants usually send proportionally more money. Taking into account the 
size of the respective groups, this explains why Brazilians and Eastern Europeans 
send proportionally more remittances than palop citizens.
attitudes toward immigration
As the opening lines of the recent World Migration Report concisely state, “Few 
areas of public policy are subject to greater misrepresentation in public and politi-
figure 8
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cal discourse, yet more influenced by public opinion, than international migra-
tion” (iom 2011, 15). Economic concerns and the prominence given to the issue in 
the media (German Marshall Fund 2011) are well-known evidence of negative 
public sentiment toward immigration. Public opinion polls on immigration con-
ducted in Portugal have tended to show quite mixed results: nevertheless, there 
seems to be a trend of improving attitudes over time. The question is, however, if 
this trend continues in the current context of increasing unemployment and 
decreasing state welfare in the wake of the global recession. On the one hand, 
according to 2006 Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2006), the propor-
tion of residents in Portugal who agreed that immigrants “contribute a lot to the 
country,” at 66 percent, was well above the European average, and second only to 
Sweden —Greece was also above the average with 43 percent, and Spain repre-
sented the EU-25 average with 40 percent (iom 2011, 11). Likewise, results from the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (Mipex) reveal a positive attitude toward immigra-
tion among the Portuguese: 69.3 percent support the idea that immigrants should 
have equal social rights; 72.2 percent defend the right to family reunification; and 
45.2 percent think that foreigners should be able to acquire Portuguese nationality 
easily (Niessen et al. 2007, cited in Fonseca and Goracci 2007). On the other hand, 
data collected three years earlier in the European Social Survey (eumC 2005, 33) 
revealed that 62.5 percent of respondents were “resistant to immigrants,” com-
pared to 50 percent in Spain and 87 percent in Greece. Yet, in the same report 
only a relatively small percentage of respondents (26 percent) opposed civil rights 
for legal migrants (eumC 2005, 31). 
ngos, and most notably aCidi, have been working to create a positive image of 
immigrants in society. In particular, aCidi has supported the production of docu-
mentaries and television programs portraying the realities of immigrants’ lives. 
They established the Immigration and Ethnic Minority Journalism for Tolerance 
Award, which recognizes journalism that has served to combat racism (Fonseca, 
Malheiros, and Silva 2005). Furthermore, several authors contend that positive 
change has occurred in the representation of immigrants in the media related with 
an increase in more objective reporting (Cádima 2003; Ferin Cunha, Almeida 
Santos, Silveirinha, and Peixoto 2004).
A recent survey implemented in three immigrant neighborhoods in Lisbon, 
Bilbao, and Thessaloniki, as part of the geitonies project, explored the attitudes of 
both native and immigrant residents toward immigration.4 Residents were asked if 
4  The survey was applied to 1 800 residents (900 natives and 900 people with an immigrant back-
ground) in nine multi-ethnic neighborhoods (three per city). The questionnaire was the same in all 
cities in order to ensure comparability to the largest degree possible. A random sampling method was 
used. The sample size was 200 in each neighborhood (100 natives and 100 immigrants), that is, 600 
interviews per city. The target population was comprised of inhabitants who had resided in the neigh-
borhood for at least one year and the sampling unit was the household.
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they agreed or disagreed that “immigrants are good for the economy” (see Figure 
9). The survey was conducted between June 2009 and May 2010 precisely when 
gdp growth dropped to its lowest (see Figure 3). Interestingly, the relative position-
ing of the countries is the same regardless of migration background. Considering 
natives, the Spanish respondents show the most favorable attitudes, with the vast 
majority either agreeing or strongly agreeing that immigrants are good for the econ-
omy (63 percent), followed by Portugal (46 percent), with Greece in last place (35 
percent). Unsurprisingly, however, migrants consistently reveal more positive atti-
tudes than natives. Almost 83 percent of immigrants interviewed in Bilbao 
believed immigrants to be good for the economy, almost three-quarters of respon-
dents in Lisbon, and over half in Thessaloniki. The Greek case is interesting as 
almost 30 percent of migrants disagree. This is likely related with the large percent-
age of Soviet Greeks in the sample, a group that shares cultural affinities with the 
native population and thus may not consider themselves immigrants. Furthermore, 
it may be evidence of tension between “old” and “new” migrants.
The relative positioning of the three cities compared to each other can be ver-
ified at the national level with European Social Survey data (Figure 10). When asked 
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if immigration is bad or good for the country’s economy, on a scale of 0 to 10 with 
the latter being positive, the mean score on average across all the countries sur-
veyed has consistently fallen below five on the negative end of the scale. Still, 
Spain has constantly remained above the average of all countries surveyed over the 
five rounds of the survey, albeit the mean score has been falling closer to the aver-
age over time. In 2010, for the first time the mean score fell below five, that is, 
below the threshold of neutrality. Portugal has sided on the negative end of the 
scale close to the average across countries or slightly below it, only peaking above 
it in 2008 and falling again, in line with the worsening economy, in 2010. The low-
est mean score (4.39 on a scale of 0 to 10) was in 2004 after the lowest gdp growth 
in almost a decade (see Figure 3). Despite this, it is important to note that fluctua-
tions have been very slight and that relative consistency is the rule. This is evi-
dence, perhaps, that the economic crisis has not deeply affected attitudes toward 
immigrants. Greece demonstrates an extremely negative sentiment, and sits clear-
ly below the average.
More general opinions gathered in the geitonies survey on natives’ openness 
toward immigrants reveal different patterns compared to the perceived contribu-
tion of immigrants to the economy. The Portuguese respondents’ evaluations are 
the most positive, with over 63 percent of natives agreeing or strongly agreeing 
that natives are open to migrants. Greek native respondents contrast starkly, with 
only 35 percent affirming the statement and over half disagreeing. While Spain is 
intermediate, it is more closely aligned with Portugal. The result for Portugal 
figure 10
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reflects well the popular perception that Portuguese culture is tolerant in its 
acceptance of others both at home and abroad. Furthermore, the experience that 
Portugal has had with emigration must be noted here as a potential explanatory 
factor. The difference in the opinions of immigrants when compared to natives in 
all three cities is very interesting. Only immigrants in Lisbon have more negative 
opinions than natives; in the other two cities the contrary is true, with immigrants 
expressing more positive opinions than the indigenous population. Immigrants in 
Bilbao have the most positive opinions, with almost 67 percent agreeing that 
natives are open to immigrants, followed by 54 percent in Lisbon and 45 percent 
in Thessaloniki.
 
Conclusions
During the last two decades, the dynamics of international migration have been 
closely associated with economic cycles, whereby since the mid-1990s new migra-
tory waves have coincided with periods of high economic growth. On the other 
figure 11
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hand, during periods of economic recession, the inflows of foreign workers have 
declined; return migration to sending regions has increased, as has re-emigration 
to other countries; and emigration of Portuguese nationals has grown noticeably.
These changes clearly show that the recent evolution of immigration to 
Portugal was steered by labor-market demand and the Portuguese model of eco-
nomic growth. During the last two decades, this has been characterized by a strong 
segmentation of the labor market and deep social disparities, where more modern, 
highly productive sectors coexist with traditional ones, mostly maintained by the 
immigrant labor force.
Immigration policies were completely inefficient in regulating migratory flows 
and only intervened reactively through mechanisms to regularize undocumented 
migrants’ status. Thus, most immigrants are confined to the secondary labor mar-
ket, with insecure working conditions, low wages, and low levels of professional 
mobility. Besides the inefficiency of the mechanisms regulating the labor market, 
visible in the informal economy, undocumented work, and precariousness of labor, 
there is also a remarkably high level of brain waste among highly-skilled migrants. 
An original feature of international migration to Portugal, resulting from the 
free circulation of workers within the EU and low wages paid in the low-skilled 
segments of the Portuguese labor market, is the coexistence of immigration and 
emigration. The process of “ethnicization” of some activities such as civil construc-
tion, industrial and domestic cleaning services, and work in hotels and restaurants 
was accompanied by the persistence of emigration among Portuguese workers to 
other European countries where they performed the same kind of activities for-
eign workers do in Portugal. More recently, with rising youth unemployment, there 
has been a steady growth of emigration among young highly-skilled professionals, 
namely to the United Kingdom, Spain, and Angola. 
Despite the economic recession and unemployment growth in Portugal, and 
unlike other European countries, such as Greece, there have not been major social 
tensions or anti-immigration attitudes expressed in political discourse, public opin-
ion, or in conflicts between national and foreign workers. This can be explained, on 
the one hand, by the integration policies, internationally recognized by the Mipex and 
the United Nations, and, on the other hand, by the fact that much of the tension that 
could result from the competition between national and foreign workers in the 
less-skilled segments of the labor market is dissipated by persisting emigration. 
Another possible explanation is the belief that immigrants in Portugal have made a 
highly positive contribution to economic growth, and immigration also has a posi-
tive role in Portuguese population dynamics. Both ideas have been supported by a 
number of studies promoted by the National Observatory of Immigration (Ferreira, 
Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Corrêa d’Almeida and Duarte Silva 2007; Valente Rosa, 
Seabra, and Santos 2004; Abreu and Peixoto 2009).
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Despite this, there is a clear need to respond to current levels of unemploy-
ment through policies designed to make the economy more dynamic and promote 
job creation. Beyond economic policy, social policies have an obvious role to play 
in safeguarding equality of opportunity among all citizens.
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